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Operating Room: Relational Spaces and
Microinstitutional Change in Surgery1
Katherine C. Kellogg
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
One of the great paradoxes of institutional change is that even when
top managers in organizations provide support for change in re-
sponse to new regulation, the employees whom new programs are
designed to benefit often do not use them. This 15-month ethno-
graphic study of two hospitals responding to new regulation dem-
onstrates that using these programs may require subordinate em-
ployees to challenge middle managers with opposing interests. The
article argues that relational spaces—areas of isolation, interaction,
and inclusion that allow middle-manager reformers and subordinate
employees to develop a cross-position collective for change—are
critical to the change process. These findings have implications for
research on institutional change and social movements.
INTRODUCTION
How is change in institutionalized practice accomplished in response to
regulation? Sociologists have long documented the complex ways that law
influences organizational action (e.g., Dobbin et al. 1988; Fligstein 1990;
Powell 1996; Edelman and Suchman 1997; Heimer and Staffen 1998; Scott
2001). On the one hand, top managers in organizations may adopt new
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formal programs to signal compliance to external audiences but decouple
these formal programs from everyday work practice (Meyer and Rowan
1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Silbey 1984; Oliver 1991; Edelman
1992). On the other hand, even when top managers provide support for
a change in practice to benefit subordinate employees, the employees for
whom the programs are designed frequently do not use them (e.g., Kalev,
Dobbin, and Kelly 2006; Kelly and Kalev 2006). Often middle managers
who administer the programs serve their own interests by actively dis-
couraging the programs’ intended beneficiaries from taking advantage of
them (e.g., Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993; Heimer 1999; Edelman,
Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). Yet, despite such pressures to preserve the
status quo, real change sometimes does occur in response to regulation.
How?
In this article, I draw on empirical data from 15 months of ethnographic
research at two U.S. teaching hospitals to demonstrate that change in an
institutionalized work practice can be effected by developing a unified
group of reformers from each of the different work positions involved in
the practice targeted for change. The regulation I studied was designed
to improve safety for patients and quality of work life for surgical resi-
dents.2 Historically, surgical residents in U.S. hospitals have worked 100–
120 hours per week; the new regulation required 80-hour workweeks for
residents starting in July 2003. In response, top managers in hospitals
across the country created new programs (described in further detail be-
low). Despite these new resources, at many hospitals residents did not use
the programs that were established for their benefit. A recent study doc-
uments that compliance by interns with the 80-hour-workweek regulation
(i.e., averaging 80 work hours per week or less each month) during 2003–
4 occurred in only 33% of general surgery residency programs (Landrigan
et al. 2006). To put it differently, merely ceremonial compliance in surgery
occurred in 67% of hospitals.
This study of two teaching hospitals (pseudonyms Advent and Bay-
shore) responding to this regulation can help us understand the process
by which an institutionalized work practice can change in response to
regulation. Advent and Bayshore were exposed to the same regulation at
the same time. The hospitals were comparable in terms of industry sector,
work organization, prior organizational performance, and other charac-
teristics that have been shown to affect organizational response to reg-
ulation. Top managers at Advent and Bayshore created similar programs
designed to help residents reduce their work hours. At both hospitals,
middle managers had equal power vis-a`-vis the subordinates who were
2 Residents are doctors who are undergoing hands-on training in their specialties after
medical school.
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the intended beneficiaries of these programs. In both sites, the crux of the
problem was that the new programs required these subordinates to chal-
lenge their managers. I observed the hospitals from three months before
the new formal programs were introduced to 12 months after they were
introduced. Despite their similarities, by the end of my 15 months of
observation, the daily practice targeted by the regulation was changed at
Advent but not at Bayshore.
In this article, I combine an understanding of institutional change with
the concept of “free spaces” from social movement theory and extend this
concept in important ways to explain the process that accounted for the
difference in outcomes at Advent and Bayshore. Social movement theo-
rists employ the term “free spaces” to describe small-scale settings—such
as the women-only consciousness-raising groups of the feminist movement
or the black churches of the Civil Rights movement—that are isolated
from the direct observation of defenders of the status quo and allow for
interaction among reformers apart from daily work (e.g., Fantasia and
Hirsch 1995; Gamson 1996; Polletta 1999). These theorists argue that free
spaces enable reformers to develop an oppositional sense of efficacy (e.g.,
Hirsch 1990b), an oppositional identity (e.g., Taylor and Whittier 1992),
and oppositional frames (e.g., Snow et al. 1986) that enable them to chal-
lenge defenders (e.g., Ewick and Silbey 1995).
In the context I studied, the challenge being mounted required coor-
dination among reformers in different work positions. I find that in order
for free spaces to facilitate a cross-position challenge, they must allow not
only for isolation and interaction but also for inclusion: they must include
reformers from each of the work positions involved in the practice tar-
geted for change so that these reformers can build a unified collective
that enables them to sustain their challenge against defenders outside of
these spaces. I call the subset of free spaces that allow not only for isolation
and interaction but also for inclusion relational spaces, and I call the
cross-position collective building that occurs in such spaces relational
mobilization.
Below, I first review the existing literature on institutional change in
response to regulation and on free spaces and describe the research setting
and the details of the research design. I then recount how defenders of
the status quo (e.g., many middle-manager surgeons) successfully resisted
change initially at both hospitals and how the hospitals’ change processes
subsequently diverged. I contrast Advent’s change process with that of
Bayshore to highlight the way relational spaces at Advent enabled middle-
manager reformers and subordinate beneficiaries to build a cross-position
collective and ultimately to change the daily practice targeted by the
regulation. I end by discussing the implications of relational spaces and
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relational mobilization for understanding microinstitutional change as
well as social movement processes.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO REGULATION IN THE
LITERATURE
Social movements often fight for new regulation intended to protect or-
ganizations’ employees or customers (e.g., Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule
and King 2006). But regulations won by social movements do not auto-
matically lead organizations to change practices (e.g., McCann 1994; Katz-
enstein 1998; Binder 2002). Sometimes regulations run counter to the
interests of powerful organization members (e.g., Edelman 1990), and
often regulations provide only ambiguous criteria by which to identify
compliance (Silbey 1981). In response, organizations may adopt new pol-
icies or programs to create believable displays of conformity for important
external constituencies but decouple these policies or programs from actual
daily practices (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Silbey 1984; Oliver 1991; Edelman 1992).
Organizational response to institutional pressure is shaped by environ-
mental characteristics, organizational characteristics, and the actions of
top managers. Organizations are more likely to adopt and use new formal
policies in response to regulation when legal objectives are clear, sanctions
for noncompliance are strong, and beliefs and norms support compliance
as the right and proper thing to do (e.g., Edelman 1990, 1992). Organi-
zations are also more likely to embrace new policies if they are nonprofit
organizations or public agencies that are highly visible because of their
large size or if they are more receptive to innovations in employment
practices because they have separate personnel offices (Baron, Dobbin,
and Jennings 1986; Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1990, 1992). When in-
stitutional pressures run counter to the interests of top managers, they
may engage in merely symbolic versus real change according to their
power vis-a`-vis external audiences (Westphal and Zajac 1994) and ac-
cording to whether the change that is called for is consistent with their
backgrounds (Fligstein 1985), their professional identities (Binder 2002;
Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003), or the behavior of high-status actors in
their organizational field (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005).
Middle managers also play an important role in organizational response
to institutional pressure because change requires overcoming commitment
to existing routines and practices (Dutton and Ashford 1993; Kalev and
Dobbin 2006). Middle managers who are sympathetic to a reform, such
as personnel officers, often become internal advocates for the implemen-
tation of new compliance programs (e.g., Kelly 2003; Bendersky 2007;
Operating Room
661
Dobbin and Kelly 2007). These middle-manager reformers assist in the
elaboration and enforcement of employee rights both because they are
committed to these ideals and because they seek to increase their power
within their organizations (Edelman 1990; Dobbin et al. 1993; Heimer
and Stevens 1997). They may use new models proffered in their profes-
sional journals, conferences, and networks to persuade top managers to
adopt particular programs (Edelman 1990, 1992; Sutton et al. 1994). Over
time, they may even come to disassociate these new programs from reg-
ulation and justify them in economic terms (Dobbin and Sutton 1998;
Kelly and Dobbin 1998; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Edelman
et al. 2001).
However, while adoption and strong support of new programs by mid-
dle-manager reformers is important, it is but one step in the process of
changing institutionalized work practices. For real change to occur, sub-
ordinate employees must actually use these new programs to change their
day-to-day work behaviors. Yet institutional theorists studying a wide
range of programs—from those established in response to civil rights law
to those established in response to OSHA regulation—have found that
the employees who would benefit most from changing work practices
often avoid using these new programs and instead continue to work in
traditional ways (e.g., Edelman 1992). For example, when top managers
responded to civil rights law by setting up internal dispute-resolution
systems, many African-Americans who believed that they were passed
over for promotion or were assigned undesirable tasks kept their com-
plaints to themselves (Kaiser and Major 2006). When top managers re-
sponded to equal employment opportunity law by broadly defining sexual
harassment and prescribing mechanisms for protecting employee rights,
women who were targets of harassment rarely reported it (Marshall 2005).
And when top managers responded to OSHA regulation by hiring safety
engineers and committing funds to safety programs to prevent illness and
injury, employees often did not bring safety problems to managers’ at-
tention (Rees 1988).
The failure of subordinate employees to use such programs can be
attributed to multiple factors. Sometimes the programs serve the interests
of outsiders rather than insiders (e.g., Gouldner 1954) or do not address
the issues that need attention (Selznick 1949). In other cases, the programs
offer ineffective mechanisms; for example, some purportedly flexible work
programs require employees to choose starting and stopping times and to
adhere to them for months rather than allowing them to shift hours daily
as needed (Kelly and Moen 2007).
One major factor in the nonuse of new programs by intended benefi-
ciaries is a constraining social context (Morrill 1995; Blair-Loy and Whar-
ton 2002, 2004). In particular, unsupportive actions on the part of midlevel
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line managers who administer the programs often lead subordinates not
to use them. Middle managers who administer these new programs may
ignore the goals of the programs as they juggle multiple work demands
(Kalev et al. 2006). They may even actively discourage the use of the
programs to serve their own interests (Edelman 1990; Edelman et al. 1993;
Harlan and Robert 1998; Heimer and Staffen 1998; Heimer 1999; Ed-
elman et al. 2001; Kelly and Kalev 2006), interests that may differ con-
siderably from those of the top managers who established the programs
(Edelman and Petterson 1999; Morrill, Zald, and Rao 2003).
Individuals make decisions about compliance according to cognitive
scripts, moral beliefs, and material self-interest (Silbey 1981; Suchman
1997), and interactions between subordinates and their midlevel line man-
agers around the use of such new programs often lead subordinates not
to do the “naming, blaming, and claiming” (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat
1981) necessary to invoke their rights. Middle managers sometimes dis-
courage subordinates from naming a traditional practice as unfair by
portraying antidiscrimination law in a negative light and depoliticizing
legal ideals (Edelman et al. 2001). They may also encourage subordinates
to blame themselves for the perpetuation of these practices by recasting
complaints as due to personality conflicts or employee deficiencies rather
than discrimination (Edelman et al. 1993; Harlan and Robert 1998). Fi-
nally, they may lead subordinates not to claim their rights by encouraging
fear of retaliation or the belief that their efforts will not result in change
(Edelman et al. 1993; Harlan and Robert 1998; Fuller, Edelman, and
Matusik 2000; Albiston 2005; Marshall 2005).
Despite these pressures for maintenance of the status quo, past studies
show that change in institutionalized daily work practices in response to
regulation does sometimes occur (e.g., Edelman 1990). However, the pro-
cess by which it occurs has not been elaborated before, perhaps because
doing so requires intensive observation of day-to-day interaction over an
extended period of time (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Barley 2008) and be-
cause it is difficult for researchers to gain access to study the implemen-
tation of regulation inside organizations (Gunningham, Kagan, and
Thornton 2003; Suchman and Edelman 2007). In this study, I combine
the concept of free spaces with insights gained from my longitudinal
ethnographic study inside two organizations to demonstrate the relational
mobilization process by which real change in an institutionalized daily
work practice in response to regulation can occur.
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FREE SPACES AND OPPOSITIONAL MOBILIZATION FOR CHANGE
Social movement theorists have developed the notion of free spaces to
explain how subordinate groups generate the capacities needed to engage
in political challenge (e.g., Polletta 1999). According to these theorists,
free spaces include such spaces as work departments and union halls
(Fantasia 1988; Hirsch 1990b), women’s social meetings on the margins
of big meetings of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(Evans and Boyte 1986), and traditional homes in the Algerian revolt
against French colonialism (Fantasia and Hirsch 1995). These spaces can
be virtual as well as physical, and their security, as well as the ease of
limiting access to them, can vary over time (Gamson 1996). Within these
spaces, reformers can engage in oppositional mobilization against de-
fenders of the status quo; they can build a sense of oppositional efficacy
(a feeling that their collective action against defenders can be successful;
Fantasia 1988; Fantasia and Hirsch 1995; Gamson 1996), an oppositional
identity that allows them to act together against newly defined adversaries
(Taylor and Whittier 1992; Snow and McAdam 2000; Polletta and Jasper
2001), and oppositional frames that highlight problems with the traditional
system and prescribe collective action solutions (Snow et al. 1986; Snow
and Benford 1988).
Two characteristics of free spaces are important to the analysis pre-
sented here: where the spaces are located (namely, apart from defenders
of the status quo) and what happens in them (interactions different from
daily work). The isolation of free spaces from defenders is critical to
mobilization because, for oppositional capacities to develop and become
shared, reformers need some autonomous space where they are at least
temporarily shielded from agents of social control (Fantasia and Hirsch
1995; Gamson 1996). The setting for interaction apart from daily work
provided by free spaces is critical because oppositional efficacy, identity,
and frames are created in encounters in intimate settings (Snow and An-
derson 1987; Fantasia 1988; Hirsch 1990a). The examination of where
these free spaces are and what happens in them is useful to understanding
the oppositional mobilization processes by which reformers ready them-
selves to challenge defenders. However, to explain the intraorganizational
change processes I saw, it is necessary to analyze an additional element—
the inclusion of reformers from each of the work positions required for
change.
In this study, I address two problems with the concept of free spaces
to help explain the dynamics I observed. First, since social movement
scholars have previously invoked free spaces as an explanation for suc-
cessful mobilization efforts without also studying failed efforts (to deter-
mine if there were no free spaces available in those efforts), it is not clear
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that free spaces can really explain success. Second, because the free spaces
that have previously been studied have been homogeneous, collecting
people who are already similarly situated and like-minded, they seem to
be ill suited for building new role relationships across reformers in dif-
ferent work positions. In the context I studied, reformers needed to build
not only an oppositional collective against defenders but also a cross-
position collective with other reformers because the challenge required
coordination among reformers in different work positions (e.g., middle
managers and subordinates). I find that in order for free spaces to facilitate
this kind of coordinated challenge across multiple positions, they must
allow not only for isolation and interaction but also for inclusion of re-
formers from each of the work positions that need to be part of the new
role relationships.
I suggest that relational spaces—a subset of free spaces that allow such
inclusion—give reformers in different work positions a forum for building
a sense of efficacy around accomplishing change with newly developed
task allocations. These spaces allow reformers to develop an identity dic-
tating how reformers in different work positions should behave with one
another. Finally, the spaces facilitate the creation of frames justifying these
new task and role expectations. Through the creation of new relational
efficacy, identity, and frames, reformers can build a cross-position collec-
tive that enables them to sustain a challenge against defenders of the
status quo and change a long-standing work practice. In what follows, I
review the methods used in this study and then describe how relational
spaces at Advent were necessary for reformers to engage in relational
mobilization and subsequently challenge and change an institutionalized
work practice.
METHODS
The methodological strategy employed in this article draws on ethno-
graphic data collection and historical comparison to generate grounded
theory. The two hospitals studied, Advent and Bayshore, were selected
because they are located in the same region, doing similar work, and
responding to the same regulation. The sequence of the research was as
follows: (1) the new regulation was announced; (2) I studied two similar
hospitals during the period just before and just after the introduction of
new formal programs designed to allow compliance with the regulation;
(3) real change in the daily work practice targeted by the regulation oc-
curred at one hospital and not at the other; (4) I collected continued data
until the end of the resident year; and (5) I examined the data to determine
the process by which a difference in outcomes occurred.
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Study of Matched Cases: Advent and Bayshore
Before this regulation, across all U.S. hospitals, the structures of surgical
residency programs—as manifested in roles and relationships among their
directors, staff surgeons, and residents—were remarkably consistent (fig.
1). Professional training in surgery followed widely accepted protocols
and the work of residents in general surgery was organized similarly across
hospitals. In the professional bureaucracies of hospitals, directors of sur-
gery departments were surgeons who managed administrative issues as-
sociated with the activities of the other staff surgeons and the surgical
residency program but had little authority over the day-to-day practices
of these staff surgeons. Staff surgeons (surgeons who had already com-
pleted their residency training) brought revenue to the hospitals by bring-
ing in surgical patients. These staff surgeons both depended on the work
of the surgical residents and provided these residents with hands-on
training.
Teams of “chiefs” (fifth-year residents), “seniors” (second-, third-, and
fourth-year residents), and “interns” (first-year residents) took care of 10–
20 patients on each particular surgery service (e.g., vascular surgery). All
residents “rotated” through areas such as general surgery, trauma, and
other specialty surgery (e.g., neurosurgery) as well as through community
hospitals, so residents frequently changed work groups. Rotation fre-
quencies depended on the level of the resident: interns spent four weeks
on each service, seniors spent six to eight weeks, depending on their
postgraduate year, and chiefs spent eight weeks.
Chiefs formulated daily plans for each patient on the service and as-
sisted staff surgeons in difficult “cases” (operations) throughout the day.
Seniors cared for the complex issues of general surgery patients and as-
sisted staff surgeons with moderately difficult cases. Interns implemented
patient plans and assisted staff surgeons with simple cases. At Advent,
seven chiefs, 16 seniors, and 20 interns who were rotating on the general
surgery services during 2002–3 were involved in the change process as-
sociated with the work-hours regulation; at Bayshore, the corresponding
numbers were five chiefs, 13 seniors, and 23 interns.3
Advent and Bayshore shared remarkable similarities along the dimen-
sions that have previously been shown by institutional theorists to affect
change in work practice in response to institutional pressure (table 1).
The hospitals were similar in size of residency program, alignment with
the public sector, existence of a personnel office, performance history,
organization type, union status, and types of diseases addressed. The
3 The narrowing of the funnel as residents progressed up the hierarchy was due not
to turnover but to planned transfers of junior residents to other specialties after initial
training in general surgery.
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Fig. 1.—Structure of surgical residency prior to work-hours regulation
authority relations between the staff surgeons and the residents were also
similar in the two hospitals.
Advent and Bayshore differed in hospital size, percentages of male and
female residents, and status of the residency program. None of these three
differences can explain the difference between Advent’s and Bayshore’s
changes in work practice. Bayshore is smaller than Advent, and insti-
tutional theorists have suggested that larger organizations are associated
with early adoption of compliance programs because they often have
greater resources to invest in new programs and are more visible to gov-
ernance bodies (Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1992). However, in this case,
Advent and Bayshore invested similar resources in the new programs and
adopted the programs at the same time. The current literature makes no
predictions about the relationship between organization size and real
change in daily work practice. Bayshore also had a higher percentage of
female residents than did Advent. Since, in general, female residents were
more open to the change in work hours than were male residents, one
would expect that this would have made change easier to accomplish at
Bayshore than at Advent. But change occurred at Advent and not at
Bayshore. Finally, the Bayshore residency program was in the middle tier
of the status hierarchy of U.S. surgical residency programs, while the
Advent program was in the top tier. One could argue that Bayshore
continued traditional practices because of middle-status conformity (Phil-
lips and Zuckerman 2001), but as I will explain in further detail below,
if Advent’s high status were what led to openness to change the work
practice, we would expect to have seen change attempted throughout
Advent rather than only in particular spaces.
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Ethnographic Data Collection
One methodological advantage of ethnographic study is that it provides
real-time data that span the period in which the change happened. I
started observing the change process three months before the programs
were introduced to establish a baseline, watched the entire process for 12
months afterward, and saw both hospitals develop a consistent pattern
regarding the targeted work practice. While the regulation requiring work-
hours reduction did not formally go into effect until 2003, Advent and
Bayshore adopted new programs to prepare for it in 2002.
For the first three months (April–June 2002), before the introduction
of the new programs, my research focused on documenting the traditional
day-to-day practices of surgical residents to establish a comparative basis
for determining how change unfolded. During this time, I interviewed
residents, staff surgeons, and directors at Advent and Bayshore and asked
questions about how the impending changes would affect patient care,
resident education, and resident quality of life in order to gauge prechange
support for the regulation.
For the next 12 months (resident year July 2002–June 2003), the research
concentrated on the change process. During the whole 15 months, I fo-
cused my observation on the interactions among the surgical residents on
the general surgery services and on their interpretations of why they were
acting as they did. From April to November, I spent 20 or more hours
per week on-site at each hospital, observing members at different times
of day and night during surgeries in the operating room (OR), on the
patient floors, and in conferences. After eight months of observation at
Bayshore, the work practice targeted for change was unchanged and
stable. Therefore, I scaled back the time I spent at Bayshore to approx-
imately five hours per week for the final seven months of fieldwork. At
Advent, where the targeted work practice had still not stabilized, I con-
tinued to spend 20 or more hours per week on-site. This enabled me to
focus on the unfolding changes in work practice at Advent while con-
tinuing to follow the stable work practice at Bayshore.
Analysis of Contradictory Outcomes
Once I had determined that real change had occurred at Advent and not
at Bayshore, I contrasted the two cases to identify the processes associated
with change in the work practice targeted by the regulation. My inductive
analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967) consisted of multiple readings of in-
terview transcripts, field notes, and archival data as well as the tracking
of patterned activities and issues related to change in ATLAS/ti, a qual-
itative data-analysis program. In my coding of the interview transcripts,
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I associated virtually every passage of more than 2,000 single-spaced pages
of text with one or more codes that flagged highly specific but recurring
topics related to change in the targeted practice. I provide more infor-
mation about my analyses below.
HISTORICAL PRACTICES AND PLANNED NEW PRACTICES AT
ADVENT AND BAYSHORE
To understand the change process at Advent and Bayshore, it is necessary
to understand both their historical and planned resident practices. His-
torically, at both Advent and Bayshore, chiefs and seniors had worked
approximately 100 hours per week (6:00 a.m.–7:00 p.m. six days per week
and 7:00 p.m.–6:00 a.m. on call two nights per week) and interns had
worked approximately 120 hours per week (4:00 a.m.–9:00 p.m. six days
per week and 9:00 p.m.–4:00 a.m. on call two nights per week).
Top managers at Advent and Bayshore introduced similar programs
to allow residents to reduce their hours. The new “night float” programs
each added three surgical residents to general surgery services, creating
a night float team to work overnight each night. At both hospitals, these
new night float programs did not merely move work around between
existing residents on the general surgery services but added three new
work positions to these services to help reduce the amount of work done
per resident.
The new night float programs were designed both to allow residents
in all years to dramatically reduce the number of nights they spent on
call and to allow interns (who had historically worked the longest hours)
to shorten their workdays so that all residents would be working 80 hours
per week. While reducing the number of nights spent on call was easy
to do at both hospitals once top managers had secured additional resources
for the night float programs (substitution of one resident for another in
the call schedule had been done frequently in the past, and this change
was seen as merely a broader set of substitutions), shortening intern work-
days was more difficult to accomplish.
The Practice Targeted for Change: Sign-out
In order to shorten intern workdays, residents needed to change a long-
standing daily work practice—the “sign-out” between the intern and the
resident covering the overnight shift. Surgical interns had historically been
responsible for all of the routine work associated with the preoperative
and postoperative care of patients. When interns were not working on
call overnight, they met with the on-call resident to sign out by reviewing
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general information on the work they had done that day and alerting the
on-call resident to very sick patients. The on-call resident took care of
any patient-care emergencies that arose for these patients overnight. But,
according to the residents (and to my observations in both hospitals prior
to the initiation of the change effort), interns did not attempt to hand off
any routine work tasks, such as completing paperwork required to admit
a new patient, to the resident covering the overnight shift. Interns took
care of all of this “scut work,” even though doing so required them to
stay in the hospital until about 9:00 p.m. and to arrive the next morning
at 4:00 a.m. to gather data on patients before morning rounds began at
6:00 a.m. At 4:00 a.m., when the intern arrived, the resident who had
stayed on call overnight would sign out to the intern by reporting on any
overnight emergencies. Since the on-call resident had not covered routine
work tasks overnight, such as gathering “vitals” (patient data) for morning
rounds, this on-call resident did not hand off work tasks to interns in
morning sign-out encounters.
Planned New Practice: Handoffs during Sign-out
To reduce their workweeks to 80 hours, Advent and Bayshore interns
would need to reduce the number of hours they worked on a regular
workday from roughly 17 hours (4:00 a.m.–9:00 p.m.) to roughly 13 hours
(6:00 a.m.–7:00 p.m.) by handing off routine work in sign-out encounters.
The new night float programs, staffed by Advent and Bayshore’s own
surgical residents, were designed to facilitate this. Table 2 outlines resident
work hours, coverage, and sign-out practices in both hospitals over several
phases; the first two columns describe the traditional system (phase 0) and
the planned new programs (phase 1 planned). At both hospitals, the
planned new night float programs were designed to allow interns to reduce
their weekly work hours from 120 to 80 and for chiefs and seniors to
reduce their weekly work hours from 100 to 80. These work-hour re-
ductions did not entail a reduction in income for any residents; annual
salaries were fixed.
Directors at both hospitals secured the resources for the new programs
by negotiating with departments outside of general surgery for the elim-
ination of other surgical resident rotations (such as community hospital
rotations) so that surgical residents would be freed up to serve on the
night float team for the general surgery services. At both Advent and
Bayshore, three positions were added to staff the night float team. Position
1 was added to assist with highly complex patient-care work such as
surgical emergencies; the resident in this position did not interact with
interns. Positions 2 and 3 were added to cover both simple and moderately
complex patient-care work and routine administrative work. At both hos-
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Fig. 2.—Change processes at Advent and Bayshore
pitals, position 2 was staffed by a designated resident who would work
six nights a week for an entire rotation, and position 3 was staffed by a
rotating group of surgical residents, each of whom would work overnight
one to two times per week and leave the hospital the following morning.
In both cases, day interns were expected to hand off any of their work
not completed by 6:00 p.m. to the position-2 and position-3 night float
residents. These night floats were expected to cover work as described
above from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., to hand off any uncompleted work
tasks to day interns at 6 a.m., and to overlap with these interns until 7
a.m. Residents were expected to work six 13-hour days per week to allow
for one hour of overlap between the night and day shifts on each end of
the day. At both hospitals the new night float programs required that
interns hand off routine work and that they do so to seniors. As will be
described in further detail below, this required interns to violate both
surgical norms (which prohibited handoffs of routine work) and the strict
surgical hierarchy (which prohibited more junior surgeons from asking
anything of those more senior). To explain how this occurred at Advent
and not at Bayshore, I will first describe the similarities in the change
processes at the two hospitals and then describe how their paths diverged
(fig. 2).
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INITIAL SIMILARITIES IN CHANGE PROCESSES AT ADVENT AND
BAYSHORE
Defenders and Reformers
At both hospitals, some people (whom I call defenders) resisted the change
and some (reformers) supported it; table 3 outlines who aligned with each
of these groups and their reasons for doing so. Many of the staff surgeons,
chiefs, and seniors were resistant to the night float programs even before
they were formally introduced and expressed this resistance in initial
interviews. It is easy to see why staff surgeons would resist: the changes
would not reduce their own work hours, and they feared an increased
workload as they would now need to communicate with a greater number
of people about patient care. In addition, the program requirement that
interns hand off work to night floats conflicted with the longstanding
surgical authority relations, which prohibited junior residents from asking
their seniors for help with routine work (Bosk 1979). Handoffs also ran
counter to the traditional surgical identity of the “iron man” surgeon who
is tough enough to withstand any hardship, including extremely long
hours. Finally, handoffs conflicted with traditional surgical beliefs about
the best ways to care for patients (one resident takes responsibility for a
patient from when the patient enters the hospital to when the patient
leaves) and educate residents (the more time residents spend in the hos-
pital, the more they learn).
While it is obvious why the staff surgeons would resist the new pro-
grams, it is less immediately obvious why chiefs and seniors would do
so, when the programs would cut their own work hours. Close inquiry
revealed that what the chiefs and seniors were resisting was not the re-
duction for all residents of nights spent on call but the specific requirement
that interns hand off routine work to seniors. First, as noted above, han-
doffs violated long-standing surgical beliefs about the best ways to care
for patients and educate residents. Second, chiefs wanted their interns to
accomplish all routine work on patient plans, as they had done in the
past, rather than relying on multiple residents to do routine work. Soon-
to-be night floats wanted to minimize their own overnight workload.
Finally, both chiefs and seniors were not interested in taking on lower-
status routine work traditionally done by interns. While it might not seem
like a big issue to a layperson, doing routine work was considered a major
problem by chiefs and seniors. One of the ways they maintained their
status as chiefs and seniors was by avoiding exactly this, the “dirty work”
(Hughes 1971).
Despite this lack of support from many individuals for the change in
the sign-out practice, there were people at both Advent and Bayshore
who privately told me in interviews prior to the introduction of the night
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TABLE 3
Defenders and Reformers
Actors Reasons for Stance on Change in Sign-out Practice
Defenders:
Staff surgeons Will not receive reduction in hours; fear increased
workload; see change as violating surgical hierarchy,
identity, and frames
Some chiefs and seniors New practice will require a change in routines; will
need to start doing low-status routine work; see
change as violating surgical hierarchy, identity, and
frames
Reformers:
Directors Risk loss of accreditation for noncompliance; hope that
reduced hours will allow them to attract the best
candidates to surgery
Patient-centered chiefs
and seniors and resi-
dents going into other
specialties
Interested in improving the valuation of work done
outside the OR
Male chiefs and seniors
who do not identify
with iron man persona
and female residents
Interested in changing the traditional iron man
identity
Interns Direct beneficiaries of the change in sign-out practice
float program that they supported it. At both hospitals, the directors of
the surgery departments supported the implementation of the new pro-
gram for two reasons. First, the directors faced the risk that their residency
training programs would lose accreditation from the Accreditation Coun-
cil for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) if they did not comply
with the new rules. Second, they hoped that the reduced hours would
enable them to attract the best candidates to their residency programs,
including those who in the past might have avoided surgery because of
long hours during residency.
While many chiefs and seniors were opposed to the changes, others
supported them. Reformer chiefs and seniors at the two hospitals included
residents who were particularly patient centered, residents who were going
into other specialties after training for one or two years in general surgery,
male residents who did not identify with the traditional iron man persona,
and female residents. Patient-centered men and residents going into other
specialties after training in general surgery were interested in direct patient
care and enjoyed working not only in the operating rooms but also up
on the patient floors, a duty labeled scut work by the defenders. One
patient-centered male resident at Bayshore said, “For me, direct patient
care is important. I want to learn how to be a complete doctor. But, for
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general surgeons, any time spent in the clinic or anything related to man-
aging patients on the floor is scut.”
Male residents who did not identify with the iron man persona sup-
ported the regulation because they thought it would help change this
traditional surgeon identity. These residents were typically in relationships
with women who expected them to take on some share of responsibilities
at home. Many of the female residents also expressed support for the
reform in interviews prior to the change effort because they wanted more
time for personal life responsibilities. One female senior at Advent noted,
“Being a surgeon isn’t so great as a woman. These guys can go out and
meet anyone anywhere who will date them. . . . It is a huge asset for
men. It means money, status, a safety net. They’re heroes. . . . But for
a woman . . . what guy wants to put up with that shit? . . . I’ve had
two dates set up since I’ve been a resident and I had to cancel both of
them to work late.”
Before the new programs were introduced, reformers and defenders at
Advent and Bayshore were similar. The beliefs of these groups were the
same and, based on the interviews I conducted before the night float
programs were established, Advent and Bayshore had similar numbers
of midlevel reformers (12 vs. 11) and similar numbers of interns who were
the beneficiaries of the change (20 vs. 23; see table 4).
In addition, there were no differences between the hospitals in the
relative authority of directors vis-a`-vis the staff surgeons or of the staff
surgeons vis-a`-vis the residents. The heads of the surgery departments at
Advent and Bayshore each served on their hospital’s board of directors
and had similar organizational tenures as surgeon-in-chief. At both hos-
pitals, staff surgeons wielded a great amount of authority over the resi-
dents. Chiefs checked in daily with the staff surgeons on the service to
review patient plans and to make changes the staff surgeons deemed
necessary; residents obeyed the commands of staff surgeons in the OR.
Directors Introduce New Programs
The directors at Advent and Bayshore introduced the new night float
programs in similar fashions at the beginning of the surgical residency
year July 2002–June 2003. At both hospitals, the staff surgeons grumbled
about the new programs, but because there was a bill in Congress calling
for national legislation on resident work hours, the staff surgeons believed
it necessary to create the programs to “satisfy the ACGME.” Because it
was the incoming chiefs who would need to manage the work on their
services in new ways, directors at both hospitals worked closely with them
to design the night float programs and assigned them responsibility for
program implementation. This delegated responsibility was relatively
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TABLE 4
Number of Middle-Manager Reformers and Subordinate Beneficiaries at
Advent and Bayshore
Advent Bayshore
Senior residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 (22)* 8 (12)
Chief residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 (6) 3 (5)
Total midlevel reformers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 (28) 11 (17)
Intern beneficiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23
Total midlevel reformers and interns . . . . . . . 32 (48)a 34 (40)
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are total residents in each category. To be conservative, these
numbers do not include the seniors and chief at Advent and Bayshore who were not interviewed
prior to the change effort. However, reformer and defender categories were stable over time until
the Advent change in night float staffing that occurred midyear. If these three Advent and two
Bayshore residents were counted based on how they acted in free spaces, the count would be 13
midlevel reformers at Advent and 12 at Bayshore. All interns are counted as beneficiaries (including
the two at Advent and four at Bayshore who were not interviewed prior to the introduction of new
programs).
* Includes nonclinical surgical residents undergoing two years of laboratory training who were
used to staff the night float team at Advent.
weak in both hospitals because the directors did not monitor progress by
requiring residents to use time sheets to report their weekly work hours.
They did not do this because, if they had, the ACGME could have de-
manded to see these time sheets during its site visits, and directors at both
hospitals wanted to determine how best to implement the new system
before tracking it in a way that the regulatory agency could follow (e.g.,
Silbey 1981).
At both hospitals during intern orientation week, the directors an-
nounced the details of the new programs in “grand rounds” meetings that
were attended by staff surgeons and residents. In addition, chiefs at each
hospital reinforced these descriptions to the residents in a separate meet-
ing. The directors in both hospitals had historically kept track of what
was happening on the surgical services by checking in with chiefs to ask
how things were going, and this is how they tracked the progress of the
new night float programs over the year.
Defenders Resist Use of New Programs
With the introduction of the new programs, interns at both hospitals tried
for a very brief period to hand off routine work in sign-out encounters
to night floats. Despite reformer support for the new night float program
at both hospitals, defender night floats initially dissuaded interns from
further handoff attempts. Defenders did this by retaliating against re-
formers who attempted change, emphasizing the traditional resident iden-
tity and framing the new sign-out practice as illegitimate.
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First, defender chiefs and seniors protected the traditional division of
labor, in which the intern on the service completed his or her routine
work without assistance from other residents, by retaliating against those
who attempted to change practice. They rewarded interns who broke the
formal rules of the new system and stayed late in the hospital by not
punishing these interns for minor mistakes, by “throwing them bones”
(assigning them interesting cases), and by including them in the daily
practical joking that they reserved for members of their select group. They
also punished those who attempted to change practice by gossiping about
them to their defender peers and to the staff surgeons. Staff surgeons at
both hospitals lent the defenders their support by making snide comments
about the 80-hour workweek when in the OR with residents and by
withholding teaching from those who attempted change. Several staff
surgeons told me that when they heard about particular interns attempting
handoffs, they felt less motivated to help these interns and took less time
showing them how to do things in the OR. Interns working with defender
seniors feared gossip and did not want to risk having their reputations
ruined in the eyes of the staff surgeons.
In addition to retaliating against those who attempted to change prac-
tice, defenders resisted change by emphasizing the traditional surgeon
identity—displaying individualism, living in the hospital, and being an
iron man—which conflicted with the planned changes. In their demeanor,
defenders displayed individualism by explicitly discounting the input of
nurses and other physicians when making their decisions. They also em-
phasized their iron man personas by enacting the cultural vernacular of
machismo through their appearance: short haircuts for men, tucked-in
scrubs tops with the pants worn low on the hips, green surgical masks
around their necks long after leaving the OR, and black leather surgical
clogs. In their language, defenders claimed that they were “old school”
residents who “trusted no one” and were the “first ones there and last to
leave.”
Defenders also reinforced the traditional position-specific identities in
their language by referring to chiefs as “commanders” (responsible for
breaking the will of the interns), day seniors as “wingmen” (who did
whatever was required to help the chief), night floats as “stopgaps” (who
covered only emergencies and performed no routine work overnight), and
interns as “beasts of burden.” They reinforced traditional position-specific
identities in their demeanor as well. For example, senior night float de-
fenders signaled their roles as stopgaps by arriving at the hospital long
past 6:00 p.m., by minimizing contact with interns, by “running the list”
(reviewing the list of patients and tasks associated with each) as rapidly
as possible, and by rolling their eyes when an intern tried to hand off the
checking of tests or films (x-rays).
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Finally, defenders resisted change by drawing on traditional surgical
beliefs to frame handoffs in sign-out encounters as illegitimate. They ar-
gued that handoffs disrupted “continuity of care” for patients (meaning
that the best patient care was achieved when one surgical resident took
complete responsibility for particular patients from the time of their sur-
gery to the time they left the hospital) and prevented “learning by being
there” for residents (meaning that residents needed to learn surgery by
spending as much time in the hospital as possible). In an example of
defenders’ stance regarding patient care, one Advent intern tried to hand
off “post-ops” (checking of patients after surgery) to the night float, and
while delays in doing post-ops had always been common because highly
trained nurses observed patients after surgery, the Advent night float told
the intern that it was not appropriate to hand off post-ops because patients
needed to be checked by the intern within three hours for good continuity
of care: “In surgery, things can turn on a dime. . . . If you’re a patient’s
doctor, you need to know them inside and out. That patient’s care depends
on you knowing every detail. The problem with handoffs is that things
fall through the cracks.” Regarding resident education, one Bayshore chief
told an intern why he should spend as much time in the hospital as possible
instead of handing off and leaving the hospital: “You can’t ever appreciate
the natural history of stuff without seeing it. Until you see someone go
down the tubes in front of your face, you don’t believe it. I went in kicking
and screaming and thought it was all a pain in the ass. I complained
bitterly. But if you don’t do it one time, poof, badness.”
Defenders also drew on traditional position-specific beliefs to frame
routine work—post-ops, “pre-ops” (completing necessary paperwork be-
fore surgery), and “admits” (admitting patients to the hospital)—as “in-
tern work.” They argued that it was fair for interns to stay until 9:00 or
10:00 p.m. and arrive at 4:00 a.m. the next morning because they needed
to “pay their dues” in order to move up the hierarchy just as the chiefs
and seniors had done before them. For example, when an Advent reformer
chief asserted that seniors needed to start accepting handoffs, a defender
chief responded by explaining why it was justifiable for seniors not to
accept handoffs: “You can’t expect them to start all over doing pre-ops
and updating cards. These guys have been there and done that. . . . You
can see how it would be tough as a senior to be told to do the intern job
all over again.” In these ways, defender chiefs and seniors drew on existing
surgical resident beliefs to frame the traditional sign-out practice with no
handoffs as natural and normal rather than problematic or unfair.
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Reformers Engage in Oppositional Mobilization against Defenders
At both Advent and Bayshore, reformers responded to resistance from
defenders by building opposition to defenders in hospital free spaces.
Groups of reformers often ate lunch together in the hospital cafeterias.
When defenders were not present, these cafeteria tables allowed for iso-
lation and face-to-face interaction among reformers. Similarly, reformers
often gathered to talk with one another in the surgical resident call rooms
or hospital hallways. To explore what happened in these free spaces, I
organized data from the free-space meetings I observed into two groups
of notes (reflecting 83 meetings at Advent and 66 meetings at Bayshore)
and coded these data to identify processes engaged in by reformers at the
two hospitals.4 I found that, in these free spaces, reformers at both hos-
pitals built oppositional efficacy, oppositional identity, and oppositional
frames that later led them to challenge defenders.
At both Advent and Bayshore, reformers built oppositional efficacy—
a sense of hope that collective-action efforts against defenders could be
successful (e.g., Gamson 1992a)—by telling one another about their de-
fiance of the defenders and of traditional practices. For example, in a
hallway conversation with several other reformers, one reformer chief at
Advent told the group that one of the other chiefs (who was known by
all to be “old school”) had given him a hard time for not having his intern
“preround” (come in at 4:00 a.m. to check on patients before morning
rounds began at 6:00 a.m.). The reformer chief said that he told the old
school chief, “They’ve been doing it this way in England for years.” A
reformer day senior who was present smiled and said that he had been
ragged on by one of the other seniors for doing “intern work” but continued
to do it anyway. As reformers began to tell stories to one another about
their defiance of defenders and of traditional practices (Ewick and Silbey
2003), they began to feel a sense of loyalty to one another and to develop
a belief that others would act with them to challenge defenders.
In addition to building a sense of assurance that others would act with
them for change, reformers developed oppositional identity (Gamson
1992b; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Polletta and Jasper 2001) by drawing
boundaries between “us” and “them” and by defining defenders as ad-
versaries who needed to be challenged. They did this by displaying the
persona of the “efficient resident” rather than being iron men and by
calling themselves residents who wanted to “have a life” rather than “live
in the hospital.” In addition, in their conversations with one another in
4 I observed a greater number of meetings at Advent than at Bayshore because, as
noted in the “Methods” section, the number of total hours I spent in observation was
lower at Bayshore than at Advent because Bayshore reached a consistent pattern of
sign-out encounters sooner.
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these free spaces, reformers began to construct themselves as “not old
school” and to name old school night floats and chiefs as adversaries who
needed to be challenged. For example, in one call-room conversation with
only female residents present, a senior Bayshore reformer said, “All of the
old school guys stay late for any case, no matter what time it goes. They’ve
all got wives at home who are willing to ‘stand by their man’ regardless
of never seeing him. But they need to be leaving those cases for the night
float.”
In addition to building a sense of oppositional efficacy and developing
an oppositional identity, reformers at both Advent and Bayshore created
oppositional frames (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988) by talking
about the legitimacy of new versus old practices and by discussing the
unfairness of maintaining traditional practices. When reformers met with
one another in free spaces, they created new arguments about patient
care (promoting continuity of care in the team rather than in the indi-
vidual) and resident education (advocating learning by doing, but over a
longer period of time).5 For example, regarding resident education, one
senior Advent reformer said at a reformer-only table during lunch, “Some
people say the interns won’t see enough now that they aren’t on call. But
I found a journal article from a long time ago where attendings [staff
surgeons] were complaining about exactly the same thing. Then it was
because residents would no longer be on call every second night. . . .
Even without taking as much call, interns today are seeing more than
they were back then because patients are a lot more acute now. And, even
if they don’t see everything this year, they will still be just as well educated
by the end of residency.”
Reformers and Defenders Battle
As they built up oppositional efficacy, identity, and frames in free spaces
at Advent and Bayshore, reformers lobbied directors for additional sup-
port and attempted to overtly challenge defenders. At both hospitals,
defenders responded by retaliating directly and bringing in their allies—
the staff surgeons. Thus, at this point in both hospitals (about five months
after the introduction of the new programs), reformers and defenders
engaged in an open confrontation with one another.
Reformer chiefs had not alerted directors earlier to problems with the
5 It is interesting that in their argument about continuity of care in the team the
reformers did not point out that the residents had also always shared work with nurses,
lab employees, and therapists. Perhaps to preserve their own professional status, even
reformers referred to the work done by those groups as less important to the care of
patients.
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use of the night float program because they themselves had not believed
in the possibility of changing the system, had not blamed defenders for
the continuation of the traditional practice, and had not framed traditional
practice as problematic. Now, reformer chiefs’ newly developed opposi-
tional efficacy assured them that other reformers would act with them
for change. Their oppositional identity as “not old school” led them to
blame defenders for the continuation of the traditional practice. And their
oppositional frames of continuity of care in the team and learning by
doing over a longer period of time enabled them to delegitimate the tra-
ditional sign-out practice and argue for change.
Reformers at both hospitals successfully convinced the directors to begin
reemphasizing their support of the official rule that night floats should
accept handoffs from interns. This explicit reaffirmation of director sup-
port led superordinate reformers and subordinate beneficiaries at Advent
and Bayshore to begin challenging defenders. Thus, interns began at-
tempting handoffs again to defender night floats.
Predictably, defender night floats resisted these challenges. The com-
bination of intern handoffs and defender night float resistance to these
handoffs resulted in “dropped balls,” which caused trouble for the chiefs
and staff surgeons. For example, when interns handed off routine tasks
that were not critical to patient care but were necessary for the normal
functioning of the service, defender night floats often “forgot” to do them.
One Advent defender chief explained, “[Intern] signed a pre-op out to the
night float the other night. The night float didn’t do it. So there I am
doing damage control the next morning, running around trying to get this
patient the right tests so he can go to the OR. Otherwise, [staff surgeon’s]
schedule gets all messed up.”
At both hospitals, defender chiefs responded to dropped balls by blam-
ing specific interns for tasks not completed by night floats. For example,
a Bayshore defender chief became outraged when he heard that a pre-
op had not been done, but rather than blaming the night float, he blamed
the intern, saying, “Seniors have already done it, so why should they do
it again? If I were a senior, I wouldn’t want to do it.” Similarly, in response
to a canceled case due to an uncompleted pre-op, an Advent defender
chief exploded:
I expect my interns to get it done. This is not shift work. They are getting
a lot of sleep. Six to six is not the right way to go. It is your patient. The
night float is not part of the team. He is covering 30 people. Something is
going to slip through the cracks. The interns on the floor are my eyes and
ears. It is unacceptable and it will be dealt with. It is a major screwup.
The patient was already going to the OR for a 7:30 case when they dis-
covered it.
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Defenders also gossiped about specific reformers to the staff surgeons.
The staff surgeons punished these reformers by making it clear to them
that the staff surgeons knew about their challenges; this was serious be-
cause maintaining a good reputation during training was crucial to res-
idents’ ability to obtain further training opportunities and job placement.
At both hospitals, reformer chiefs responded to dropped balls by alerting
directors to this problem and by naming specific night floats as rule brea-
kers. Defender chiefs countered by denying that these night floats had
purposely dropped balls. Directors tried to informally find out more about
this in their conversations with other residents. Defender night floats heard
that directors were asking about them and were angry with reformers for
“whining” about them to the directors. But at this point in both hospitals,
defender night floats were being supported by the powerful defender staff
surgeons and chiefs and they continued to drop balls.
As dropped balls continued at Advent and Bayshore, staff surgeons
expressed their anger about lapses in patient care to the directors. While
the staff surgeons had expressed displeasure when the night float program
was introduced, they had not continued to discuss it with the directors
except in passing comments about how badly trained the future generation
of surgeons was going to be. Now that the night float system was directly
negatively affecting them, they began to complain to the directors that
something needed to be done.
RELATIONAL SPACES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVERGENCE
Different Outcomes at Advent and Bayshore
While change processes at Advent and Bayshore were very similar at
first, member action in the two hospitals diverged after defenders began
to drop balls. At Advent, reformers sustained a cross-position challenge
to successfully pressure defenders to change the sign-out practice, and at
Bayshore they did not. I compared sign-out encounters at each hospital
during two periods: prior to the introduction of the night float programs
and after a consistent pattern of sign-out encounters emerged that char-
acterized sign-outs for the remainder of the resident year.6 I tracked 101
morning and evening sign-out encounters between day interns and resi-
dents covering the overnight shift on the general surgery services at the
two hospitals during these two periods; I directly observed 56 encounters
and received detailed reports of the other 45 shortly after they occurred.
The patterns of activity were the same in both the observed and the
6 To measure sign-outs in the second period, I count all sign-outs that occurred, starting
with the first sign-out in the consistent pattern.
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reported sign-out encounters. In addition, I asked about intern sign-out
practices in my ongoing in situ interviews and found that the sign-outs
I observed were comparable to other sign-outs occurring at the same time.
At both Advent and Bayshore before the introduction of the night float
programs, interns did not hand off routine work in any of the morning
and evening sign-out encounters I tracked. After the change process had
moved into a steady state at Advent, interns handed off routine work in
91% of these sign-out encounters. In contrast, after the process had moved
into a steady state at Bayshore, intern sign-out practice was unchanged
(table 5).
Thus, of our two cases, one resulted in the change of a traditional work
practice in response to regulation and the other resulted in the reinforce-
ment of this same practice. How do we account for this difference?
Relational Spaces of Isolation, Interaction, and Inclusion at Advent
and Not at Bayshore
I argue that the difference in outcomes at Advent and Bayshore is as-
sociated with the different availability in the two hospitals of relational
spaces—a subset of free spaces that allowed for not only isolation and
interaction but also inclusion of reformers from each of the work positions
involved in changing the sign-out practice. “Afternoon rounds” meetings
on services staffed with only reformers at Advent served as relational
spaces because they allowed for isolation from defenders, interaction
among reformers, and inclusion of residents in all work positions involved
in the practice targeted for change. As I will describe below, there were
also services at Bayshore that were staffed with only reformers, but af-
ternoon rounds meetings there did not serve as relational spaces and no
other relational spaces existed at Bayshore.
At both Advent and Bayshore, residents on each particular service (e.g.,
the vascular surgery service) had historically gathered together every eve-
ning sometime between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. for afternoon rounds. During
afternoon rounds, residents reviewed the patient-care work that had been
carried out by the intern for each patient on the service that day. At both
Advent and Bayshore, services were staffed in a rotating manner, so that
roughly every month there was a different constellation of residents (chief,
day senior, intern, and night float) assigned to each service. In many
months, this constellation of residents included at least one defender, so
that meetings on the service were not shielded from the social control of
defenders of the status quo. However, at both Advent and Bayshore, there
were months when services were staffed with only reformers and bene-
ficiaries (but only at Advent did afternoon rounds function as relational
spaces).
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TABLE 5
Different Outcomes at Advent and Bayshore (%
of Sign-out Encounters with Handoffs)
Hospital
Traditional
System
New System
(Steady State)
Advent . . . . . 0 (20a) 91 (35)
Bayshore . . . 0 (16) 0 (30)
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are Ns of sign-out encounters.
* Includes morning and evening sign-outs.
Table 6 displays the staffing for each of the services at Advent for each
month of the resident year after the establishment of the night float pro-
gram. Each chief and day senior on each service for a given month is
coded as a defender (D) or a reformer (R) according to interviews con-
ducted privately with each resident before the new program was intro-
duced. Interns are coded with a B to denote them as beneficiaries. Each
month, two of the services were staffed with a designated senior who
served as the night float every night, and this resident is also coded as a
defender or a reformer. The other two services were staffed with a rotating
night float, so on some nights a defender was working as the night float
and on other nights it was a reformer. Services at Advent that were staffed
with only reformers (e.g., service 1 in September and October) had af-
ternoon rounds meetings that served as relational spaces because they
allowed for isolation, interaction, and inclusion. Staffing schedules for the
year were created prior to the beginning of the resident year, and residents
were assigned to particular services randomly. Thus, relational spaces
existed prior to and independent of the reform effort.
At Advent, afternoon rounds on reformer-only services provided iso-
lation from defenders because they were traditionally held with only res-
idents who were assigned to the service present in the room. Chiefs as-
signed to particular services had their favorite places—such as conference
rooms or isolated areas of patient floors—informally staked out for these
meetings. One Advent intern distinguished nonisolated spaces from the
isolated spaces that enabled him to more freely express nontraditional
thoughts: “As an intern, there’s no way I’m going to speak up in front
of everyone. A lot of these guys are really against the changes. You’d be
crazy to suggest it [in front of the whole group]. . . . When I was on
[general surgery service] with [reformer chief] and [reformer day senior],
they were both very open to trying new things. So I felt comfortable
suggesting things like how to handle pre-ops. We tried things and it
worked well.”
Advent afternoon rounds also facilitated face-to-face interaction. Chiefs
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and seniors had historically spent time in afternoon rounds asking interns
about that day’s surgeries and about appropriate care for patient con-
ditions as well as fraternizing with one another. Thus, Advent afternoon
rounds allowed residents on reformer-only services to gather and spend
some time together. An Advent reformer senior explained, “Afternoon
rounds are important because it’s a time for everyone on the service to
be updated on what everyone else is doing. . . . In morning rounds,
everyone is rushing to get to the OR and then we are all running around
all day. In afternoon rounds, we have time to talk about how things are
going. It’s more relaxed.”
Finally, Advent afternoon rounds included members from each of the
positions involved in the practice targeted for change. At Advent, the
chief, senior, and intern on the service had traditionally attended afternoon
rounds. Once the night float program was established, the night float
usually also joined in for at least some portion of afternoon rounds. The
inclusive character of Advent afternoon rounds was important because
any change to the sign-out practice would require the coordination and
cooperation of residents from each of the different work positions on the
service. One Advent reformer senior noted, “All of us spending time to-
gether during afternoon rounds is especially important in this new system.
If the intern has work left to do, the chief and I can find out what it is
and can take some of it to help out.”
Afternoon rounds at Bayshore did not allow for isolation, interaction,
or inclusion (table 7). They did not allow for isolation, even on reformer-
only services, because they were held in the surgical resident lounge, where
residents not assigned to the service were present working on the lounge’s
computers. Like Bayshore, Advent had a surgical resident lounge, but
the Advent lounge had a TV and did not have computers in it. The
Advent lounge was seen as a social space rather than a workspace in
which to hold afternoon rounds.7 Afternoon rounds at Bayshore did not
allow for interaction apart from the work itself because they were limited
to reporting on the status of patient plans. Finally, they did not allow for
inclusion because, due to historical work routines, only the chief or the
day senior typically attended afternoon rounds with the intern, with the
chief checking in with the intern by phone later when he or she was not
present during rounds.
The differences between afternoon rounds at Advent and Bayshore
were displayed in high relief at a community hospital staffed by residents
from both hospitals a few months before the night float programs were
introduced. Historically, the work at this community hospital had been
organized so that there was one surgical service staffed by Advent resi-
7 In neither case did staff surgeons spend any time in the resident lounges.
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TABLE 7
Free Spaces and Relational Spaces at Advent and Not Bayshore
Advent and
Bayshore All-
Reformer
Lunch Tables
or Call Rooms
Afternoon Rounds on Reformer-
Only Services
Advent Bayshore
Type of space Free Relational Neither free nor
relational
Isolation from
defenders
Yes; meetings
held in areas
without
defenders
Yes; meetings
held in private
conference
rooms
No; meetings held in
surgical resident
lounge
Interaction (intimate
conversation fo-
cused on issues
other than work
itself)
Yes Yes No
Inclusion (all mem-
bers involved in
practice targeted
for change)
No; all members
from same ser-
vice not
present
Yes; chief, senior,
intern, and
night float
present
No; chief and intern
or senior and in-
tern present with
other member
checking in by
phone later
dents and a separate surgical service staffed by Bayshore residents. But
during this time, the schedule was reorganized so that residents from
Advent and Bayshore worked on services together. There was such an
outcry from residents from both hospitals that the schedule was quickly
switched back. One of the major reasons for the distress was the different
expectations about afternoon rounds. Bayshore residents complained that
Advent residents “rounded all over the damn hospital,” “rounded all day
long,” and were “uptight about mandatory attendance at rounds”; Advent
residents, in turn, characterized Bayshore residents as “slackers” who
“hung out talking in the lounge” and “always tried to get out of coming
to rounds.” These respective outraged reactions were illustrative of the
very different kinds of spaces provided by afternoon rounds meetings at
the two hospitals.
In addition to afternoon rounds not functioning as relational spaces at
Bayshore, there were no other places at Bayshore that could serve as
relational spaces. For example, while Bayshore free spaces in the cafeteria
and hallways enabled isolation and interaction, they did not, in practice,
allow for inclusion. I never observed a situation where all residents on a
reformer-only service ate lunch together. Residents assisted surgeons in
the OR during the day, and it was extremely rare for all residents on the
TABLE 8
Creation of New Capacities in Free Spaces and Relational Spaces (% of
Observed Meetings)
Lunch Tables or
Call Rooms*
Afternoon
Rounds*
Advent Bayshore Advent Bayshore
Type of space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Free Free Relational Neither
Oppositional mobilization:
Building oppositional efficacy:
Telling stories about defiance of
defenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 32 26 0
Reassuring colleagues of willingness
through reciprocal stories . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 20 10 0
Developing oppositional identity:
Talking about “us” vs. “them” . . . . . . . . . . 77 83 81 0
Defining “them” as adversaries who
need to be challenged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 50 32 0
Creating oppositional frames:
Talking about legitimacy of new vs.
old practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 56 77 0
Discussing the unfairness of maintain-
ing traditional practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 42 29 0
Relational mobilization:
Building relational efficacy:
Coll. identifying task problems . . . . . . . . . 0 0 61 0
Jointly negotiating task solutions . . . . . . 0 0 55 0
Developing relational identity:
Demonstrating new language and
demeanor in front of one another . . . 0 0 97 0
Offering help across positions in front
of one another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 84 0
Creating relational frames:
Justifying new task allocations or role
behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 42 0
Reinforcing justifications in front of
team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 23 0
N observed meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 66 31 22
Note.—Data are from the meetings for which I have detailed notes; there was no difference in how
I chose which meetings to record in detail at Advent and Bayshore. I observed a greater number of
Advent meetings because, as noted in text, Bayshore reached steady state sooner.
* “All-reformer lunch tables or call rooms” vs. “Aftenoon rounds on reformer-only services.”
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service to be out of the OR at the same time. Thus, cafeteria tables
provided for isolation and interaction but not for inclusion. Similarly, I
never saw all residents on a reformer-only service gather with one another
in a hallway or call room during the day.
One might wonder whether the differences in outcomes at Advent and
Bayshore are a result of a difference in organizational culture or status
at the two hospitals, with Advent’s culture or high status promoting
change and Bayshore’s culture or middle status promoting stability. If
Advent’s culture or status were what led to change in the sign-out practice,
we would expect to have seen change attempted by Advent reformers in
afternoon rounds on services staffed with both reformers and defenders
as well as on reformer-only services, and I did not see this. Thus, it appears
that while a particular kind of culture or high status may predispose
organization members to attempt change, whether members actually suc-
ceed in effecting change will depend on whether the organization has
relational spaces available for reformers. To put it differently, we cannot
attribute the difference in outcomes simply to a difference in organiza-
tional culture or status at the two hospitals.
In order to explore what happened at Advent, I coded data from 31
meetings in relational spaces. I found that these spaces enabled reformers
to engage in relational mobilization processes with reformers in different
work positions on their services (table 8). Without access to relational
spaces, Bayshore reformers did not engage in relational mobilization pro-
cesses and so were not able to sustain a cross-position challenge in the
face of fierce defender resistance.
RELATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND SUCCESSFUL CHANGE AT
ADVENT
Advent Reformers Build Relational Efficacy
While reformers at both Advent and Bayshore built a sense of oppositional
efficacy against defenders, only at Advent did they build what I call
relational efficacy—an assurance that reformers in different work posi-
tions would each complete the diverse tasks required to successfully ac-
complish a new sign-out practice. Reformers at Advent built relational
efficacy by collectively identifying practice problems and by jointly ne-
gotiating solutions.
In afternoon rounds meetings on reformer-only services, Advent re-
formers collectively identified the problems they were having with im-
plementing their new interdependent practices. For example, an intern
reported that, because he was no longer arriving before morning rounds,
he could not write progress notes in the patients’ charts before going to
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the OR at 7:00 a.m. Similarly, a day senior noted that he would like to
help the intern with implementing patient plans but had no way of know-
ing whether these plans had changed since morning rounds. Since after-
noon rounds included members from each of the work positions involved
in the sign-out practice, these members had a forum for identifying prob-
lems stemming from their new ways of working.
In addition to identifying new practice problems, reformers negotiated
joint solutions to these problems. Changes in practice between two mem-
bers of the team often required change by a third team member. For
example, in one afternoon rounds meeting, a reformer night float replied
to the intern’s concern about patient notes by saying that he could write
the patient notes overnight so that the intern did not need to arrive early
to do this before morning rounds. But, on nights that were very busy, he
would not be able to get to it. The chief supported this plan and suggested
that in these circumstances it was fine for the intern to write the notes
later in the day. Similarly, when a reformer day senior said that he was
hampered in helping the intern because he did not know about ongoing
changes to patient plans, the chief suggested that he could change his
own practice and begin sending patient plan updates to the whole team
rather than just to the intern.
Since team members on the service frequently interacted with one an-
other outside of afternoon rounds meetings, they also improvised new
solutions during the day. These improvisations led to either new problems
or new ways of accomplishing tasks, which were then discussed in the
afternoon rounds meetings so that proposed changes could be negotiated
with all members involved. For example, in one instance, the day senior
helped the intern by admitting a new patient when the intern was in the
OR. However, the day senior did not have the opportunity to tell the
intern he had done this, and when the intern left the OR, he received a
nurse’s page with a question about the new patient whom he knew noth-
ing about. At afternoon rounds, the intern noted this problem, and the
reformers decided that whenever a resident on the service admitted a new
patient, this resident would send everyone on the service an e-mail doc-
umenting key details about the patient.
Advent Reformers Develop Relational Identity
While at both Advent and Bayshore reformers created an oppositional
identity as “not old school” in contrast to defenders, only at Advent did
reformers build what I call relational identity—a new sense of self in
relation to reformers in other work positions. Advent reformers created
relational identity by using language and demonstrating a demeanor in
front of one another that supported the new task allocation.
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During afternoon rounds meetings on reformer-only services, reformers
used language to elaborate new role expectations for each work position
that were different from the traditional expectations. They referred to
chiefs as “coaches” rather than “commanders,” to day seniors as “team
players” rather than “wingmen,” to night floats as “members of the team”
rather than “stopgaps,” and to interns as “rookies” or “good prioritizers”
rather than as “beasts of burden.” For example, in afternoon rounds one
day, the day senior informed the intern, “If I’m out of the OR and you’re
in the OR and an admit comes in, I’ll do it. I know that a lot of the old
school guys just wait for the intern to get out and do it. I know seniors
aren’t expected to do it. But I believe in the team concept, in everyone
working together to take care of the patients.”
A change in role expectations for one member on the service often
required a change in role expectations for another. For example, once a
day senior started acting as a team player toward the intern by taking
on routine work, that day senior could no longer act as a wingman toward
the chief by being available at all times as backup. Because all residents
involved in the sign-out practice were present at afternoon rounds, they
were able to negotiate changes in interdependent role relations with all
involved.
Reformers also elaborated new role expectations by using nontraditional
demeanors with one another. For example, reformer chiefs encouraged
group discussion and decision making among residents at all levels rather
than holding the floor and issuing orders without explanation. Similarly,
both chiefs and seniors treated interns with warmth and respect rather
than aggressively “pimping” them and using punitive methods of disci-
pline. Interns acted relaxed with reformers in other positions rather than
tense and subservient as they did on services staffed with defenders.
Advent reformer chiefs and seniors presented themselves as willing to
help the interns do any type of work that needed to be done rather than
avoiding work that had not traditionally been done by residents at their
respective levels. For example, in one afternoon rounds meeting, the day
senior and the chief offered to enter orders and a discharge so that the
intern could finish some of his other tasks by the end of his shift. An
excerpt from my field notes of this meeting says, “[Intern] finishes running
through patient updates. [Day senior] says that he can put the orders in.
[Intern] hesitates and says OK (doubtfully). [Chief] tells intern to go and
that he will write the discharge on [patient]. [Intern] says OK and leaves.
[Chief] goes to the computer to enter the discharge order.”
As all members on the service offered help to one another, they began
to develop friendly and trusting relations and to see themselves as a team.
Feelings of attachment to other team members made them feel comfort-
able deviating from traditional role expectations. Because residents in all
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work positions were present in afternoon rounds, each resident knew that
the others were open to offering and receiving help across positions. For
example, one intern said, “Now that I’ve gotten to know [night float], I
know that he is being sincere when he tells me to hand off my pre-ops
and post-ops. He’s a good guy. I know that he’s not going to go around
telling other people that I’m weak. . . . I also know that [chief] knows
that I’m handing off, and that this is okay with him.”
Advent Reformers Create Relational Frames
While reformers at both Advent and Bayshore created oppositional frames
against defenders, only at Advent did reformers build what I call relational
frames—frames that explained new role relationships. They did this by
justifying new task and role expectations and by reinforcing new frames
in front of one another.
Advent reformers legitimated new task allocations and role behaviors
in afternoon rounds meetings on reformer-only services as they explained
to one another why it was fair for them to work in new ways. For example,
during afternoon rounds one day, a reformer day senior said, “Some of
the night floats have been complaining that interns are giving them work
to do. They are grumbling that the interns are giving them attitude, and
they’re refusing to take post-ops that came out [of the OR] before they
arrived.” The reformer chief justified the new task allocation between
intern and night float by replying, “The purpose of the night float is to
take the intern sign-out so interns can leave the hospital. It is unfair to
the interns otherwise.” The chief then turned to the intern on the team:
“You need to be signing everything out to [night float] at 6. Otherwise,
the longer you’re here, the longer you’re here. You will never get out of
here if you don’t do it.”
Here it was important to have all members involved in the sign-out
practice present because a change in frame for the night float (from “I
already paid my dues” to “the purpose of the night float is to take the
intern sign-out so the intern can leave”) also required a change in frame
for the intern (from “I need to be the first one here and the last to leave”
to “the rules require me to leave the hospital”). Because both the night
float and the intern were present, both residents were able to hear these
new, interdependent justifications.
In addition to justifying new task allocations and role expectations,
reformers reinforced the justifications expressed by others and thus de-
veloped team frames. For example, in the interaction described above,
the rotating night float was a reformer and she reinforced the chief’s
frame, saying, “It’s my job to take your sign-out. That’s what I am here
for. I have time.” Here it was important to have members in each work
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position present so that they could all commit to new frames. One reformer
chief noted to me that he purposely discussed rationales for handoffs in
front of the whole team rather than in individual conversations in order
to demonstrate his support for change to everyone on the service.
Advent Reformers Sustain Cross-position Challenge and Defenders
Accommodate Change
By creating the new capacities of relational efficacy, identity, and frames
in relational spaces at Advent, reformers built a cross-position collective
that enabled them to sustain their challenge against fierce resistance by
defenders. In the face of dropped balls, continued overt challenge was
risky not only for interns but also for reformer chiefs, day seniors, and
night floats. Reformers from each of the different work positions sustained
their commitment to collective action for change in the face of such risks
by drawing upon and adding to their newly created relational efficacy,
identity, and frames. For example, interns continued to attempt handoffs
despite punishment and reputational risks because reformer chiefs, day
seniors, and night floats had demonstrated new behaviors toward them
and had argued that the new task allocation between interns and other
team members was justified. One intern said, “In the beginning, I felt
bad about signing out. The night floats would be at dinner bragging that
they still had a few hours before the interns were ready to sign out. . . .
After being with a few helpful night floats and chiefs, I began to look at
it differently. Now I feel like I’m not asking for a favor. I’m just sticking
by the rules.”
Reformer day seniors continued to help interns with routine tasks be-
cause they saw themselves as team players and because they had devel-
oped friendship bonds with the interns that made them want to help
them. Reformer night floats continued to overtly accept handoffs because
it was “their job,” even though they were sanctioned by some of their
peers for doing so and even when there was clearly no personal benefit
to them from changing the sign-out practice and therefore taking on more
work. One reformer night float said, “Some of the night floats are way
too focused on what the interns aren’t doing instead of on the fact that
we get to go home at night now on every rotation except this one. One
scut rotation is a small price to pay for getting to work 80 hours a week
instead of 100.”
Similarly, reformer chiefs assisted in the successful accomplishment of
handoffs by handling “minor snafus” and not denigrating the interns in-
volved with them. They did this because they had seen that it was possible
to effectively accomplish the sign-out practice with handoffs as long as
other residents on the service were willing to take on nontraditional tasks
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and because they saw themselves as coaches of teams rather than as
commanders of wingmen and beasts of burden. One chief noted,
Some people are old school and say, “I’m going to do it myself.” For me,
it is the team that is going to take care of everything. Each of us takes
personal responsibility to make sure that patient care is the best it can be,
but that doesn’t mean doing it all yourself as long as all of the pieces fit
together. . . . My job as chief is to be like a coach, to teach and be supportive
and clue into when people are having problems. . . . Interns can still learn
responsibility for patients even if they don’t do everything themselves. The
night floats are part of the team. They need to be taking responsibility
overnight.
Because reformers sustained their challenge, dropped balls at Advent
continued and staff surgeons became more and more upset. When staff
surgeons expressed their anger about lapses in patient care to the directors,
reformer chiefs pointed out that dropped balls were not a necessary out-
come of handoffs. They argued that handoffs between interns and re-
former night floats had been handled easily without lapses in patient care
whenever the chief, senior, and night float on the service had been willing
to work in a less hierarchical manner by taking on routine work. These
reformer chiefs suggested that since the staunchest defenders were the
rotating seniors on the night float team (position 3) who both did not
want to do “intern work” and were “not committed” to the service because
they were working on the night float team only once or twice a week (vs.
the position-2 night float seniors, who also did not want to do routine
work but who were more committed to the service because they worked
on the night float team six nights a week for an entire rotation), Advent
could solve the problem by replacing these rotating seniors with a des-
ignated intern. There was an intern assigned as a “day float” on the general
surgery services, and reformers suggested that this intern could be moved
to cover position 3 for an entire rotation (so that this intern’s rotation
would now consist of working overnight as a night float rather than
working during the day as a day float). The directors talked to the staff
surgeons about this possibility, but staff surgeons initially resisted the idea
because they did not want to lose extra help with coverage during the
day.
However, problems associated with dropped balls continued, creating
a crisis for staff surgeons. Presented with the evidence of successful han-
doffs among reformers, ten-and-a-half months after the introduction of
the night float program and five months after the advent of dropped balls,
the staff surgeons accommodated the suggestion and agreed to have the
intern from the day float position replace the senior in the rotating night
float position. Similarly, defenders who had previously argued that han-
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doffs were detrimental to patient care now began to suggest that handoffs
were not so much of a problem. For example, one of the previously
defending chiefs said, “I was definitely concerned that with all of the
handoffs patient care would suffer. But it is fine, because people are
extremely conscientious.” The previously defending chiefs also now sug-
gested that although the interns might learn more slowly, they would
learn all they needed to know by the end of residency. One said, “It might
be that they can’t put in chest tubes and lines themselves. But that’s a
technical thing that can be taught in their second year. That is not what
makes a good intern or a good doctor. I’ll teach them lines and chest
tubes next year.” Once the intern was moved onto the night float team,
and the previously defending staff surgeons, chiefs, and seniors came to
terms with handoffs, night floats began to accept handoffs in sign-out
encounters.
It is interesting that the position-2 senior on the night float team was
now willing to accept handoffs of intern work when he or she had not
been willing to before. Residents explained that this occurred for several
reasons. First, now even the previously resistant defender chiefs and staff
surgeons supported handoffs. Second, before the rotating night floats were
replaced with the single intern, the position-2 resident had been part of
a larger group of night floats composed of both this resident and the
rotating position-3 residents. Now that this rotating group of residents
was replaced in position 3 by one intern who was supporting change, if
the position-2 night float had continued to drop balls, he or she would
have been highly visible as a single person resisting handoffs.
In addition to making it more likely that night floats would accept
handoffs, the new support of the prior defenders at Advent also made it
easier for interns to attempt handoffs. One intern who had not attempted
handoffs since the very beginning of the year reported, “I’ve started hand-
ing off. . . . I used to think of night floats as not part of the team—that
they were stopgaps just to get the patients through to the next day. Now
even the old school chiefs assume that the night float will do it. Before,
as the intern, I would think, ‘It’s my fault if it doesn’t get done.’” With
the change in staffing, handoffs in sign-out encounters became the new
steady-state practice at Advent.
NO RELATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND FAILED CHANGE AT
BAYSHORE
While midlevel reformers and subordinate beneficiaries on reformer-only
services at Advent used the relational spaces their afternoon rounds pro-
vided to build capacities for cross-position collective action, at Bayshore
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there were no spaces, even on reformer-only services, that allowed for
isolation, interaction, and inclusion. In the absence of relational spaces,
Bayshore reformers did not develop an assurance that reformers in dif-
ferent work positions on the service would each complete the diverse
tasks required to successfully accomplish a new sign-out practice. They
did not develop new role expectations for residents in different work
positions. And they did not create justifications for a new task allocation
and role expectations. Without building a new relational efficacy, identity,
and frames, they were not able to create a unified collective and sustain
a cross-position challenge in the face of defender resistance.
Bayshore Reformers Do Not Build Relational Efficacy
Without access to spaces that enabled the inclusion of reformers from
each of the work positions involved in the practice targeted for change,
Bayshore reformers did not create relational efficacy by collectively iden-
tifying problems and negotiating joint solutions. In free spaces such as
cafeteria tables, hallways, and call rooms, I sometimes saw Bayshore
reformers identifying problems to one another and even talking about
solutions. But reformers who congregated in free spaces often were not
working on the same service as one another. Without reformers on the
same service from each of the work positions involved in the sign-out
practice involved in these conversations, reformers were not able to con-
tribute all perspectives on problems or to negotiate solutions with one
another. For example, in one call-room conversation, two reformer day
seniors on different services suggested several solutions to the problem of
interns staying late—rounding early to identify what routine tasks were
left to do so that others on the service could help the intern with these
tasks and having the intern and the night float take more time to discuss
what needed to be done overnight:
Reformer 1: The interns are still staying late every night. I think we need
to improve this. The night float should take over the duties early enough
so that others can go home. We need to make a habit of rounding earlier.
Then if the intern is swamped, we can help.
Reformer 2: The problem is that the way it is now, the intern can ask the
night float but there is only a 40% likelihood that it will get done. Some-
times the night floats don’t know what is supposed to be done. The interns
have to take care to make sure the night floats know what is going on.
One of these reformer day seniors was working on a reformer-only
service at the time, but none of the other reformers from that service were
present for this conversation. Thus, this day senior did not have a forum
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to negotiate these potential solutions with the chief, intern, and night float
on the service, and the solutions were not implemented.
Sometimes new practices were attempted, but “things fell through the
cracks” and there was no space for negotiating joint solutions to problems.
For example, one night an intern on a reformer-only service had several
admits left to do, so he told the reformer night float during sign-out about
a lab test that needed to be done. The patient had a colon infection, and
the chief wanted a lab test to document the white cell count before starting
antibiotics so that the effectiveness of the drugs could be measured. The
intern updated the night float about the necessary lab test for this patient
while running through the list of patients and ended his sign-out by saying,
“If you could draw labs, it would be great,” meaning for the night float
to do a lab test on this particular patient. The night float thought that
the intern was asking him to draw labs on the newly admitted patients
and so did not draw labs for the patient with the colon infection. The
next morning, the reformer chief was upset that the labs on this patient
had not been drawn. At Advent, such problems had also occurred and
team members had jointly talked through communication mishaps to try
to develop new systems for ensuring that necessary information was prop-
erly understood by all. At Bayshore, no group discussion occurred between
the chief, day senior, intern, and night float on the service, so this problem
was seen as an example of something falling through the cracks rather
than as a logistical problem that could be collectively solved using a new
division of labor.
Bayshore Reformers Do Not Develop Relational Identity
In the absence of spaces where reformers from each of the work positions
involved in the sign-out practice were present, Bayshore reformers on
reformer-only services also did not create a new relational identity by
collectively elaborating new role expectations or offering help across work
positions in front of other members on the service. In free spaces, I some-
times saw reformers from reformer-only services adopting nontraditional
language or demeanors with one another and offering help to one another.
But, since the members of that reformer-only service did not all gather
together as a group, reformers in each different work position did not
have the opportunity to create commitment to a new interdependent set
of roles with one another. Because they had not developed new roles,
reformer chiefs and day seniors who helped interns saw themselves as
“being nice” as opposed to acting appropriately for someone in their
position.
Similarly, interns who handed off routine tasks to reformer night floats
that these night floats did not complete blamed themselves rather than
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expecting the night floats to do these tasks and working with them to
solve problems. For example, one reformer night float told the intern on
their reformer-only service that she was happy to write progress notes in
the patients’ charts overnight so that the intern could take care of more
urgent tasks before leaving the hospital, but one night the night float was
not able to do it. The intern told me, “Today I came in for rounds at 6:
00 a.m., but not all of the progress notes were done. There was no time
for me to do them between answering pages and going to the OR. So I
had to take the progress notes to the conference and try to write them
there, and they didn’t get done until the end of the day.”
A similar problem had occurred at Advent and had been addressed in
an afternoon rounds meeting with all team members present. There, the
team had agreed that it was fine for notes to be written later in the day
by the intern when the night float had been too busy to get to them; this
developed the expectation that the night float as a “member of the team”
was responsible for progress notes. At Bayshore, without such a change
in role expectations, the intern blamed himself for what he perceived as
failing to do his own work. Because the chief expected the night float to
be a stopgap rather than a member of the team and expected the intern
to be a beast of burden rather than a good prioritizer, the chief did not
ask the intern about the circumstances and blamed the intern as well.
Bayshore Reformers Do Not Create Relational Frames
Finally, I did not observe Bayshore reformers working on reformer-only
services collectively justifying new tasks and roles or reinforcing new
frames with all others on the service. I did observe reformers in particular
work positions justifying new task allocations or role behaviors to one
another as they interacted at meals or in hallways or call rooms. However,
without the chief, day senior, intern, and night float from the service all
involved in these discussions, there was no opportunity to get collective
buy-in to these justifications from all members involved in the sign-out
practice or for members to demonstrate their commitment to these frames
in front of one another. For example, I observed a reformer chief on a
reformer-only service tell the intern on the service that it was necessary
for the day senior to do some routine work so that the intern could leave
at the end of his shift. Without the day senior present, there was no
opportunity for the chief to persuade him that the new task allocation
and role behavior were justified. In addition, there was no opportunity
for the intern to see if there was consensus among other service members
around this justification offered by the chief.
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Bayshore Reformers Do Not Sustain Cross-position Challenge and
Defenders Do Not Accommodate Change
Interestingly, the same solution that was used successfully at Advent to
facilitate handoffs was available at Bayshore—there was an intern serving
in a day float position who could have been moved to replace the rotating
night float. Bayshore reformers suggested this to the directors and the
directors talked to the staff surgeons about this possibility. Like the ones
at Advent initially did, staff surgeons at Bayshore resisted this idea be-
cause they did not want to lose extra help with coverage during the day.
However, unlike at Advent, reformers at Bayshore did not continue to
challenge defenders in the face of dropped balls, so there was no crisis at
Bayshore to force the staff surgeons to accommodate reformer demands.
Without a new relational sense of efficacy, reformer chiefs were concerned
that it might not be possible to accomplish handoffs without dropped
balls. One reformer chief said, “[Reformer senior] was trying to help the
intern during the day, but it didn’t work. Things inevitably fell through
the cracks, even though [reformer senior] was trying to be helpful. . . .
It may be that it’s just not possible in surgery for this to work.”
Without a new relational identity outlining new role expectations, re-
former day seniors saw themselves as wingmen to the chiefs and reformer
night floats saw themselves as stopgaps handling emergencies overnight
rather than as team players who helped interns with routine tasks. With-
out relational frames justifying new task allocations, interns believed that
routine work was their job and that it was their own fault if they were
not fast enough and were left with tasks at the end of their shift. Reformer
chiefs and day seniors felt that routine work was intern work rather than
work that they should be taking on to ensure that the intern did not have
many tasks left at the end of the day. In the end, without these new
relational capacities, and in the face of resistance from defenders, reform-
ers stopped attempting handoffs, and Bayshore reformers failed to ac-
complish change in the sign-out practice (at least during the time of this
study).
DISCUSSION
Relational Spaces and the Importance of Inclusion
These findings contribute to the literature on institutional change in re-
sponse to regulation and to the literature on social movements in several
ways. Institutional theorists have shown that organizational response to
institutional pressure is associated with particular environmental char-
acteristics such as dominant beliefs, norms, and resources (e.g., Edelman
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1990; Ruef and Scott 1998; Scott et al. 2000), regulatory regimes (Tolbert
and Zucker 1983; Baron et al. 1986; Katzenstein 1998) and community-
specific requirements (Lounsbury 2007; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007),
particular organizational characteristics such as alignment with the public
sector (Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1992), existence of a personnel office
(Baron et al. 1986; Edelman 1992), and organizational performance (West-
phal and Zajac 1994), and particular top-manager characteristics such as
work background (Fligstein 1990) and professional identity (Binder 2002;
Rao et al. 2003). Since Advent and Bayshore were matched on each of
these environmental, organizational, and top-manager characteristics,
these characteristics alone may not be sufficient for explaining change in
an institutionalized work practice. Such change may also depend on mi-
crolevel processes occurring inside organizations (Barley 1986, 2008; Zil-
ber 2002; Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006; Powell and Colyvas
2008). The present study adds to our understanding of microinstitutional
change by demonstrating that, in the face of resistance by defencers of
the status quo, the emergence of relational efficacy, identity, and frames
are necessary for change to occur, and relational spaces are at least one
route to getting there.
The isolation from defenders that relational spaces provide is critical
to change because midlevel reformers and their subordinates are often
not comfortable trying out new task allocations, expressing new identities,
or discussing nontraditional ideas when defenders are present, for fear of
retaliation. This discomfort may be especially pronounced for lower-status
reformers who are in the numeric minority (Loyd 2008). Having a setting
for interaction apart from work itself is crucial because it facilitates dis-
cussion of new tasks, identities, and frames. Finally, inclusion of reformers
from all of the different work positions involved in the practice targeted
for change is important because it enables collective coordination and
negotiation of new relational tasks, roles, and frames. Since shared com-
munication contexts have been shown to reduce conflict (Hinds and Mor-
tensen 2005), one might think that to accomplish change in a work practice
in response to regulation it is necessary to bring defenders and reformers
together to plan and implement compliance programs with one another.
However, the findings presented here suggest the opposite. For routine
practices to change when defenders of the status quo resist it, reformers
from each of the work positions involved in the work practice must have
spaces apart from defenders to coordinate their efforts with one another.
In addition to contributing to institutional theory, the concept of re-
lational spaces contributes to social movement theory. Social movement
theorists have highlighted the importance of free spaces in allowing re-
formers to ready themselves for a collective challenge of defenders of the
status quo (e.g., Fantasia and Hirsch 1995; Gamson 1996; Polletta 1999).
Operating Room
703
Yet previous studies of free spaces have documented successful mobili-
zation efforts without detailing failed efforts (to determine if there were
no free spaces available in those efforts), so it is not clear from past
research that free spaces can really explain success. In addition, social
movement theorists have not explored what kinds of spaces are necessary
when the challenge being mounted requires reformers to carry out dif-
ferent yet interdependent tasks. This is unfortunate because challenges
interesting to social movement theorists often require such a division of
labor. For example, during the bus boycotts of the Civil Rights movement,
a division of labor was required for successful challenge: some reformers
needed to avoid using buses, while others needed to provide transport for
the boycotters (e.g., McAdam 1982). According to the argument presented
here, reformers likely used relational spaces to coordinate their efforts in
this case, but these spaces and the processes occurring within them have
not been previously examined.
The role of relational spaces in social movement processes may be
particularly important inside organizations. Theorists have used social
movement concepts to describe how mobilization occurs in organizational
fields and inside organizations (e.g., Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Louns-
bury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Davis et al. 2005; McAdam and Scott
2005; Briscoe and Safford 2008; Davis et al. 2008) and inside organizations
(e.g., Zald and Berger 1978; Lounsbury 2001; Scully and Creed 2005;
Kaplan 2008; O’Mahony and Bechky 2008). These scholars have argued
that mobilization may look different inside organizations because of the
important role played by top managers (Scully and Segal 2002; Raeburn
2004; Clemens 2005; Zald, Morrill, and Rao 2005; Weber, Thomas, and
Rao 2009). The findings presented here suggest that even when top man-
agers are committed to change, relational spaces may be necessary for
mobilization inside organizations to occur. Reformers trying to create a
unified group across different work positions may need such spaces to
coordinate their completion of different yet interdependent tasks before
they can effectively challenge defenders.
Relational Mobilization and the Building of a Cross-position Collective
In addition to explaining the importance of relational spaces, these find-
ings add to social movement theory and institutional theory by detailing
the institutional change process of relational mobilization—the building
of capacity for challenge among reformers in different positions. While
social movement theorists have explained how oppositional mobilization
(mobilization against defenders) occurs (e.g., Fantasia 1988; Gamson
1992b; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Polletta and Jasper 2001), they have
not explored how relational mobilization (mobilization in relation to other
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reformers) happens. As social movement theorists would predict, reform-
ers at both Advent and Bayshore used free spaces to build oppositional
capacities that allowed them to challenge defenders of the status quo.
They built a sense of oppositional efficacy that made them willing to take
risks and assured them that others would act with them to challenge
defenders. They created an oppositional identity that made it easier for
them to act “inappropriately” to challenge defenders and gave them a
sense of obligation to act on behalf of their group. They developed op-
positional frames that identified a problem and specified a collective
solution.
Despite this, change occurred at Advent and not at Bayshore because
at Advent, in addition to generating oppositional capacities for collective
action against defenders, reformers generated relational capacities for col-
lective action with one another. The building of relational efficacy—a
sense of hope that change was possible through the use of a new division
of labor among reformers—occurred as reformers collectively identified
task problems and jointly negotiated task solutions. The development of
relational identity was accomplished as reformers demonstrated new lan-
guage and demeanors and offered help across positions in front of one
another. Relational frames were created as reformers justified new task
allocations and reinforced new relational frames with one another. Re-
lational mobilization facilitated the development of a cross-position col-
lective that allowed reformers to be successful in their fight against de-
fenders in a situation where the challenge being mounted required
coordination and cooperation among reformers in different work
positions.
An understanding of relational mobilization contributes to institutional
theory as well as to social movement theory. Theorists have begun to
build an institutional theory of the remediation of inequality, suggesting
that the structure of workplace programs can counteract work practices
that disadvantage particular groups of employees (Kalev et al. 2006; Cas-
tilla 2008), particularly since lack of structure makes opportunities for
inequality more likely (Fernandez-Mateo 2009). For example, Kalev et al.
(2006) have documented that workplace programs that assign account-
ability for change to line managers are effective in increasing the pro-
portions of white women, black women, and black men in management
positions while programs that attempt to train managers in the benefits
of diversity or help women and minorities to combat social isolation
through networking are not.
The findings presented here suggest that a workplace process—rela-
tional mobilization—can also help remediate inequality. At both Advent
and Bayshore, directors created weak structures of accountability: they
assigned responsibility for the change to the chief residents but did not
Operating Room
705
track residents’ weekly work hours to evaluate progress because they
feared that this tracking might be seen by the regulatory agency before
they had successfully accomplished change. Yet, despite a weak structure
of accountability similar to the one at Bayshore, relational mobilization
enabled change at Advent.
Future Research
This analysis raises several questions for future research. Since studies of
compliance with this work-hours regulation show that only a third of
hospitals that have introduced compliance programs have actually used
these programs to make the required change (Landrigan et al. 2006), there
must be a number of reasons for merely symbolic compliance. A claim
that relational spaces are the only factor accounting for the difference in
outcomes at these hospitals would not do justice to other possible con-
ditioning factors that a comparative ethnographic study cannot detect.
First, there were several factors that were present at both Advent and
Bayshore that were clearly important to the change process—supportive
top managers, a cadre of committed reformers, and free spaces—and
because these factors were present at both sites it is not possible to know
how they each affected the process. Future research could explore what
critical mass of reformers is required for successful change. It could also
investigate what types of top-manager resources best enable change in
daily work behaviors. Finally, it could elaborate whether some opposi-
tional mobilization processes that occur in free spaces are more important
than others.
Second, this kind of observational study cannot identify unobservable
factors that may have influenced the change process. For example, de-
fenders’ or reformers’ relationships with their superiors, colleagues, or
professional association may have led to power differences playing out in
the two different hospitals and beyond that were not detected. In addition,
it is possible that unobserved personality differences or social skill dif-
ferences (Fligstein 1997) between reformers at the two hospitals led Ad-
vent reformers to be more open to change or better at accomplishing it.
Future research mapping structure in the patterns of ties between groups
of actors (e.g., Wheat 2005) and testing for reformer characteristics could
examine the effects of these additional factors.
In sum, this study elaborates how change in institutionalized practice
inside an organization can be accomplished in response to regulation in
the face of resistance from defenders of the status quo. Even when top
managers support a new program to change an institutionalized practice,
middle managers whose interests run counter to the new program are
likely to resist it and to attempt to persuade their subordinates to refrain
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from using it. I demonstrate here that middle managers sympathetic to
reform and their subordinates can successfully change practice in such a
situation by interacting with one another in spaces of isolation, interaction,
and inclusion to build new task allocations, new role expectations, and
justifications for these new tasks and roles. This relational mobilization
can enable reformers to sustain a cross-position challenge in the face of
defender resistance and to pressure defenders to change practice. In this
way, relational spaces and relational mobilization enable the microinsti-
tutional change that new regulation is designed to promote.
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